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Abstract 
In this paper we study the earnings effects of career interruptions 
caused by unemployment or a period out of the labour force. The model is 
estimated separately for males and females on a Dutch 1985 labour market 
survey. The results show thatfor males there is a short term but no long term 
wage effect of unemployment, while there is no effect of a period out of the 
labour force. For females there is no wage effect of unemployment and both a 
short term and a long term negative wage effect of a period outside the labour 
force. 
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1. Introduction 
A worker looses nis or her job either voluntarily or non-voluntarily. A 
voluntary job loss occurs if a worker retires or stops working in the organized 
labour market in exchange for household production, for example to take care 
of young children. In the first case the person involved does not return to the 
labour market, in the second case there is most likely a career intermption 
since the person involved returns to labour market after the children have 
grown older. A non-voluntary job loss occurs in case of a dismissal. If it takes 
some time to find a new job, the worker also experiences a career 
intermption. 
In terms of human capital formation a career intermption may have 
three distinguished effects. First, the formation of human capital on the job 
connected to accumulation of work experience stops. Second, the stock of 
human capital may depreciate due to attrition. Finally, after re-entering a job 
the depreciated human capital may be restored rapidly. The latter phenomenon 
is called the rebound effect. 
The effects of a career intermption on human capital formation has 
been studied frequently, by investigating the development of wages with and 
without a career intermption. In these studies cross-sectional retrospective or 
panel data are used. The results of the studies differ substantially, in the 
estimates of both the depreciation rate during the career intermption and the 
rebound effect. Some studies find a small depreciation rate, other studies fmd 
a sharp depreciation effect in combination with a subsequent large rebound 
effect, causing the net depreciation effect to be small. In the sequel we will 
discuss some of the empirical studies which are mostly on womens' wages and 
on voluntary withdrawals. 
In this study we distinguish two kinds of career interraptions: 
unemployment and out of the labour force. We estimate the model separately 
for males and females. 
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical 
framework and discusses the results of empirical studies on the wage effects of 
a career intermption. Section 3 contains a description of our empirical model. 
Section 4 describes our data, which are from a Dutch 1985 labour market 
survey. In section 5 we present the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The wage effects of a career interruption 
2.1 Empirical studies 
The effects of a career intermption on the life cycle income of an individual 
worker is shown in figure 1 (derived from Mineer and Ofek (1982)). For the 
sake of simplicity, income is drawn as a linear function of age. 
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- flgure 1 about here -
Line ABL of figure 1 represents the age-income profile of a worker 
who has a payed job from leaving school until retirement. The profile 
ABCDEFG shows the income of an individual person who has a career 
interruption at age V. In this case we distinguish four periods: before 
interruption (AB), interruption (CD), restoration (EF) and post-restoration 
(FG)1. 
After the career interruption the worker finds a job with a wage that is 
lower than the pre-interruption wage. This effect is due to the depreciation of 
the stock of his human capital. The theory of human capital provides a number 
of arguments for this depreciation, some of which are summarized under the 
heading atrophy. 
According to figure 1, human capital is restored rapidly in the period 
immediately following re-entry, which is the so called rebound effect. In this 
restoration period wages rise quickly. 
In the post-restoration period the growth rates of income of workers 
with and without a interrupted working career are assumed to be equal. Both 
types of workers spend part of their time investing in human capital so that 
their investment ratio (the ratio of investment expenditures to gross income) 
will be equal. 
Empirical studies on the wage effects of career interruptions differ in 
numerous aspects. An important difference is that of the data used in the 
analysis. The data are from different countries and different time periods. 
Furthermore, some studies use cross-section data with a retrospective element, 
others use panel data. We give a brief survey which highlights some of these 
differences, starting with studies based on US data and ending with studies 
based on European data. The studies we discuss are summarized in table 1. 
- table 1 about here -
The seminal empirical study on career interruption and wage formation 
is by Mineer and Polachek (1974). They estimate earnings functions for 
married women, containing segments consisting of periods of either work 
experience or home-time. Women's wages depend on their work history, years 
of schooling and other variables like mobility, health, number of children. 
Three sorts of costs are distinguished: direct opportunity costs of forgone 
1
 The broken line ABCDEFG in figure 1 is the profile of an unexpected 
interrupted working career. Several studies suggest that an individual who anticipates 
a career interruption accumulates less human capital in the period before interruption 
(AB) than a worker who expects a continuous working career (Mineer and Polachek, 
1974; Mineer and Ofek, 1982; Cox, 1984). 
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earnings, loss of experience on which future wage growth is conditioned, and 
a depreciation of prêviously accumulated human capital. The atrophy effect 
due to non use of the human capital stock ('getting rusty' as the authors called 
it) is thought to be by far more important than the usual depreciation of human 
capital due to use or to aging. The data used in the estimation are from a 1967 
cross sectional survey, i.e. the information on work histories is on a retro-
spective basis. One of the problems in estimating an earnings function is the 
possible endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables, like for example 
the experience variable. Apart from OLS the authors also use 2SLS, with the 
work experience variables depending on exogenous variables. Mineer and 
Polachek find an average annual depreciation rate during home-time intervals 
of 1.5%. 
Sandell and Shapiro (1978) replicate the Mincer-Polachek study using 
the same database. Their criticism on the Mincer-Polachek study is threefold. 
First, some of the regression results are biased because of the use of incorrect 
data. Second, in interpreting the estimation results one should distinguish 
between the effect of general training and the effect of firm specific training. 
The length of general training is equal to the number of years of labour 
market experience, while tenure with the current employer is a measure of the 
length of firm specific training. Third, simultaneity is not only important with 
respect to work experience, but also with respect to home time. In their 
estimates Sandell and Shapiro find a negligible depreciation effect in non-
working periods. 
In reaction to the Sandell and Shapiro (1978) article, Mineer and 
Polachek (1978) scrutinize their original depreciation hypothesis by estimating 
wage growth equations, using panel data of the period 1967-71. They conclude 
that there is a annual depreciation due to career interruption of about 2.5% 
which confirms their original fïndings. 
Corcoran and Duncan (1979) distinguish five periods of work history: 
years out of the labour force since leaving school, years of work experience 
prior to working for one's present employer, tenure with the present employer 
prior to the present position, tenure during training completed in present 
position and post training tenure in present position. They used cross-sectional 
data to estimate wage equations for four categories of workers distinguished 
by sex and race. The variable 'years out of the labour force' only has a 
significantly negative effect for white women, an effect which is rather small: 
one half of 1 percent for each year out of the labour force. Corcoran and 
Duncan conclude that labour force withdrawal has a small and usually 
insignificant effect on human capital formation. 
Next to cross-sectional retrospective data, Mineer and Ofek (1982) use 
panel data on womens' wages in their estimates. They introducé a new 
element in the analysis: a restoration period in wage growth, just after the 
return to work. In their estimates based on cross-sectional data they fmd a 
long run depreciation effect due to non participation that is much smaller than 
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the short run effect of 3-8 percent per year. In their estimates based on panel 
data they find similar effects. The difference between short run (the first year 
following an interruption) and long run effects is attributed to the rapid wage 
increase in the restoration period. 
Corcoran, Duncan and Ponza (1983) use a wage change specification to 
estimate the effects of a career interruption for women. They find a short run 
depreciation of about 3 percent per year. The erosion of human capital is 
restored rapidly, soon after labour market re-entry. Corcoran et. al. conclude 
that the net depreciation effect is rather small: there is a sharp negative 
depreciation effect, but subsequently there is an equally dramatic positive 
rebound effect. 
Cox (1984) compares cross section and longitudinal estimates for the 
depreciation of human capital of women outside the labour force. He 
concludes that the depreciation rate using cross sectional data is about 5 
percent per year, which is substantially higher than the rate using panel data of 
about 3 percent per year. 
Gronau (1988) estimates a simultaneous model of wages and planned 
withdrawal. It appears that wages have an effect on planned withdrawal, but 
planned withdrawal has no effect on wage formation. The wage gap between 
man and women originates from differences in on-the-job training and job 
requirements. Labour market withdrawal induces depreciation of human 
capital. 
Ruhm (1991) uses panel data of the period 1971-75 to estimate the 
effects of career interruptions in both unemployment and earnings equations. 
The effect on unemployment appears to be small and transitory, the effect on 
earnings is substantial. Even 4 years after reentering on a job a career 
interruption has a negative effect of 10-13%. Ruhm concludes that career 
interruptions lead to scars in earnings, suggesting significant worker attach-
ments to specific jobs. 
A few European studies are also summarized in table 1. Dutch studies 
of the wage effect of career interruptions are by Groot, Schippers and Siegers 
(1988, 1990). In both studies cross-sectional retrospective data are used. In the 
analysis there is no distinction between short run and long run effects, while 
there is no estimate of the rebound effect. In the first study Groot et.al. find a 
depreciation rate due to nonparticipation in the labour market for women of 
about one half of 1 percent per year. In the second study an annual 
depreciation rate for men of about 1 percent is found. 
Ackum (1991) uses Swedish panel data of the period 1981-85 to 
investigate the effect of unemployment on subsequent earnings. She concludes 
that each additional year of unemployment reduces subsequent earnings by 
about 2%. 
Ermisch and Wright (1991, 1993) use 1980 UK data to investigate the 
effects of a withdrawal from the labour force. They also distinguish between 
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parttime and fulltime workers and conclude that fulltimers are penalized twice 
as much as parttimers for a year out of employment. 
Edin and Nynabb (1992) basically replicate the study by Gronau (1988), 
using Swedish panel data of the period 1984-86. They fmd a positive effect of 
time spend outside the labour force, but the effect of past separations is 
smaller than the effect of past experience. 
2.2 Modelling wage effects 
The starting point of our analysis is the Mincerian earnings function (Mineer 
(1974)), which specifies at for individual i the logarithm of earnings as a 
function of education and working experience: 
In W, = ft, + &S, + &X; + J83X,2 + u, [2.1] 
in which: W; = individual i's earnings 
Sj = i's amount of education 
X; = i's amount of working experience 
U; = disturbance term with expectation zero 
Since this earnings function has been motivated in rnany studies our discussion 
on the basics of the function is brief (See Oosterbeek (1992) for a recent 
discussion). The /3j (j=04,2,3) parameters describe the process of capital 
accumulation. The parameter /3X represents the rate of return on formal 
education. Empirical studies usually find rates of return of about 5 to 10 
percent (see Psacharopoulos (1985) for a survey). The j32 and j33 parameters 
represents the effect of investments in skül augmenting activities, i.e. in 
working experience. It is assumed that investment decreases linearly over the 
working period, until it equals zero at the date of retirement. This leads to a 
wage equation with a (positive) linear and a (negative) quadratic working 
experience term. 
If individuals start working immediately after they have finished their 
formal education and if they stay on that job for their remaining working life, 
equation [2.1] can be estimated directly, using information about wages, 
education and working experience. In reality, workers change jobs, loose their 
jobs because they are fired or they withdraw from the labour market to 
become back after a few years. All of these types of change may affect the 
formation of human capital and thus the development of the wage. 
We distinguish between different time periods, all measured in months: 
- working experience prior to working at the current job or prior to the 
last interruption period (E) 
- interruption period of unemployment (U) or out of the labour force (O) 
- rebound period after the last interruption period, either after 
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unemployment (RJ or after a period outside the labour force (R0); we 
assume the rebound period to have a maximum length of 24 months 
- tenure in the current job (T) 
Human capital formation may differ in each of these periods. We use the wage 
effect of working experience prior to working at the current job or prior to the 
last interruption period as the reference effect. Therefore, we specify the 
amount of working experience as follows: 
X, = E; + j83U, + ftO, + j S ^ , + &R0>i + /37(TrRu,rR0ii) [2.2] 
Consider first the effects of an interruption period of unemployment. If the 
human capital formation during unemployment is less than on the job, then /33 
< jö7. If there is destmction of human capital during the unemployment 
period, then j33 < 0. If there is a rebound effect after the spell of 
unemployment, then j35 > /37. 
The effects of a period outside the labour force are similar. If the 
human capital formation is less than on the job, then /34 < /37. If there is 
destmction of human capital during the period outside the labour market, then 
,/34 < 0. If there is a rebound effect after period outside the labour market, 
then /36 > j37. Finally, if there is more human capital formation in the current 
job then there was in the previous ones, then /37 > 1. 
It is obvious, that the long term wage effect of an interruption period 
depends on the balance of the immediate negative effect during the 
interruption period and the positive effect during the rebound period. We will 
first consider the wage of worker j with a period outside the labour force and 
a subsequent job with a tenure that exceeds the rebound period (>24 months). 
We compare the development of this wage with that of individual k, with the 
same personal characteristics and previous employment history (Ej=Elc), who 
gets a job at the same time as individual j starts the period outside the labour 
force. So: 
Oj + Tj = Tk [2.3] 
If there are no long term effects of the period outside the labour force, then 
the amount of working experience contributing to human capital formation is 
the same for both workers: 
Ek + /37Tk = E, + /340j +/36.24 + /37(Tf24) [2.4] 
Substituting Tk from [2.3.] into [2.4.] and rearranging we find: 
& = (ft " &).(0/24) + fr [2.5a] 
If there is a long term negative effect of the interruption period on the 
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development of the wage, then: 
& < (fr - PMO/24) + 07 [2.5b] 
Using the general subscript i, we define: 
06* = 06 " (07 - 04)-(Oi/24) - 07 [2.6a] 
04* = 04-07 P.6b] 
Then, we can distinguish between three situations with respect to the wage 
effects of an interruption period outside the labour force: 
{06*=0, 04*=0} : no wage effects 
{06*=O, 04* <0} : temporary, no long term wage effects 
{06*<O, 0 /<0} : long term wage effects 
Similarly, to incorporate the effects of an interruption period of 
unemployment, we define: 
0 / = 05 - (07 - 03)-(CV24) - /37 [2.7a] 
03* = 03-07 [2.7b] 
Then, we can distinguish between three situations with respect to the wage 
effects of an interruption period of unemployment: 
{05*=0, 03*=0} : no wage effects 
{05*=0, 03* <0} : temporary, no long term wage effects 
{05* < 0, 03* < 0} : long term wage effects 
Substituting [2.6] and [2.7] into [2.2] and rearranging we fmd: 
X, = E; + 07.(Oi+Ui+Ti) + 03*.U,(l-(Ru,/24)) 
+ 04*.Ui.(l-(Ro,i/24))+ 05*.^, +06*.ROii [2.8] 
Using this specification of Xj and estimating wage equation [2.1] we can 
determine the short term and long term effects of both interruption periods. 
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3. Econometrie framework 
For the empirical analysis we distinguish six labor force states: 
0. Currently unemployed or out of the labor force; 
1. Employed and never had an interruption period; 
2. Current tenure after last spell of unemployment is less than two years; 
3. Current tenure after last spell of out of the labor force is less than two 
years; 
4. Current tenure after unemployment is more than two years; 
5. Current tenure after out of the labor force is more than two years; 
Each individual in the sample is observed in only one of these six labor force 
states. Allocation over the six labor force states is not likely to be random. 
With non-random selection over labor force states, estimation of the wage 
equation with variables for the rebound period from unemployment and out of 
the labor force and variables for the length of previous spells of 
unemployment and out of the labor force, will suffer from selectivity bias. 
The techniques for correcting for selectivity bias are usually applied to cases 
in which there are only two options (binary choice models). In the two step 
method proposed by Heekman (1979) probit estimates on the binary choice 
variable are used to derive sample selection bias correction terms. These 
correction terms (the inverse Mills ratios) are added to the continuous 
dependent variable equation. 
To fix ideas we first consider the case in which there are only two labor force 
positions (binary choice case). Let I be a binary indicator variable for the 
labor force state of the individual i, where: 
I = 1 if YiO! > 0 
and [3.1] 
I = 0 if Y^ < 0. 
where Y; is a vector of variables for individual i deterniining the labor force 
position of the individual with associated coefficients a. 
Let <f)(.) and $(.) denote the Standard normal density and distribution 
functions, respectively. The inverse Mills ratios are defined as: Xa = 
(t)(Yta)/(l - $(YiO!)) and A^  = -4>(Yia)/,ï)(Yia:). These correction terms are 
added to the wage equation. 
Commonly in case of sample selection, two wage equations are 
estimated, one on the cases for which 1 = 1 , and one for the cases for which I 
= 0. Here we estimate a single wage equation for the entire sample, and still 
correct for sample selection. In this case the sample selection corrected 
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parameters are obtained from estimating: 
log wage = & + j8,Si + j82X, + &X2; + (<r12/V'a2)K, [3.2] 
where: A; = IX^ + (1 - I ) ^ , on is the covariance between the selection 
equation and the wage equation and a2 is the variance of the selection 
equation. This approach is similar to the two step method proposed in 
Heekman (1978) for endogenous dummy variables in simultaneous equation 
sy sterns. 
In this paper we use an extension of the two step method for the binary 
selection variable to the case in which there are more than two options. We 
proceed under the assumption that the different labor force states are 
uncorrelated. Let Iy = 1 if individual i is observed in labor force state j ; 
otherwise Ij = 0 (j = 1, , 5). It is assumed that individual i is observed in 
labor force state j (Iy = 1) if: 
Y ^ + ey > max(z^k Y ^ + eik, 0) i ^ k, i,k = 1,...,5 [3.3] 
where e is a random term capturing unmeasured and unmeasurable effects on 
the labor force position. The reference group consists of workers currently 
unemployed or out of the labor force. If we assume that e has a logistic 
distribution this generates the multinomial logit model, where: 
Prob(Iy = 1) = exp(Yio:j)/exp(l + E k Y ^ [3.4] 
The distribution of the multinomial logit model is denoted by F^CXJ), i.e. 
F(YiQ;j) = Prob(Iy = 1). Lee (1983) presents a method for correcting for 
selectivity bias in models with more than two choices. In this method the 
multinomial distributions are transformed to Standard normal random 
variables. Let J^c^) = $"1(F(Yio:j)).2 The selectivity bias correction term for 
option j (Ay) becomes: 
Ay = IyXy - (1 - Iy)Xy[(l - F ^ C ^ / F ^ ) ] [3.5] 
where Xy = 0(J(Yio;j))/F(YiQ;j). The correction terms Ay are added to the wage 
equation. We estimate the following wage equation: 
log wagei = /30 + ftSj + /32Xj + /38X2j + ^Aa + w2A2 + co3Ai3 + 
co4Ai4 + co5Ai5 + /t, [3.6] 
2
 The inverse of the Standard normal distribution was calculated by the 
approximate function given by Bock and Jones (1968). 
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where 
X, = E, + MOi+Ui+T;) + ^.U^l-CR., ,^)) 
+ &\U,(l-(R0;i/24)) + &*.Ru, +j8«*.Ro.i P.8] 
and /Xj is a normal distributed random teraï and ojy is the covariance between 
J(Y;0!j) and //,;. 
Because of non linearities in the X terms, the wage equation is estimated by 
maximum likelihood. 
4. The data 
The data are taken from the Dutch 1985 labour market survey of the 
Organisation for Labour Market Research (OSA). The first wave was held in 
the Spring of 1985 and consisted of 4020 observations. From this data set we 
took a sub-sample of individuals who reported to be either wage earner, not 
employed but actively searching for work, or not employed and not actively 
searching for work. Unemployed workers are defined as all individuals who 
are not in paid employment but who report to be actively searching for work. 
Out of the labor force are all individuals who are not in paid employment and 
who are not searching for work. Past unemployment spells and spells out of 
the labor force are defined in a similar way. Individuals who are retired, 
disabled or in full-time education are omitted from the sample. 
After further elimination of observations from which information on 
essential variables could not be retrieved, 1547 observations for males and 
1845 observations for females remained for the analysis. Of the 1547 males, 
1317 are wage earners while 230 are either currently unemployed or out of the 
labor force. Of the 1845 observations of females, 736 currently have a paid 
job while 1009 are unemployed or out of the labor force. 
Table 2 about here 
In table 2 some descriptive statistics of the sample are given. The dependent 
variable in the wage equations is the log of the hourly wage rate. The hourly 
wage rate is defined as weekly earnings divided by hours of paid employment. 
5. Estimation results 
The parameter estimates of the multinomial logit equation describing the 
labour market status of the workers are shown in table 3. The reference 
category in the logit equations consists of individuals who are currently 
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unemployed or out of the labor force. Two explanatory variables are used to 
describe the present labor force status of the individual: years of education and 
age. 
- table 3 about here -
All coefficients of years of education (an) are positive. This indicates 
that a higher education increases the probability of being observed in 
employment and decreases the probability of being unemployed or out of the 
labor force. The coëfficiënt of years of education is highest for workers who 
have never experience an interruption period (an). High educated workers 
have a higher probability of an uninterrupted career than low educated 
workers. A year of education increases the probability of never having had an 
interruption period by 30 to 40 per cent, relative to individuals who are 
currently unemployed or out of the labor force. 
Except for the states relating to out of the labor force (i.e. a3l and a5l) 
the education coëfficiënt is higher for females than for males. This indicates 
that for females there is a sharper division between high and low educated 
individuals in present labor force state than there is for males. 
Except for the rebound period out of the labor force, all age coefficients 
are significantly negative. This indicates that in general older workers are 
more likely to be unemployed or out of the labor force than younger workers. 
A year of education decreases the probability of never having had an 
interruption period by 6 to 12 per cent. 
- table 4 about here -
The estimation results with respect to the parameters of the wage equation 
[2.1] for both males and females are presented in table 4. The table shows 
estimation results without and with inclusion of selection terms. The 
coefficients of the sample selection correction terms for the first two years 
after unemployment (o )^ are negative. These negative selection effects can be 
explained from a search-theoretic perspective: the lower the reservation wage, 
the higher the probability of finding a job. The coefficients of the sample 
selection correction terms for the first two years after a period outside the 
labour force (CJ2) are positive. These positive effects may indicate that even 
though persons outside the labour force do not search for jobs, they 
occasionally get job offers, which they sometimes accept. There are no 
selection-effects if tenure exceeds a period of 2 years (coefficients w3 and co4). 
From the OLS-estimates it appears that the average annual rate of 
return from education is 4.5 % for male and 5.1 % for female workers. As 
predicted by the human capital theory, the experience-eamings profile is 
parabolic for both male and female workers. From the results of the estimate 
in which the selectivity terms are included it appears that the average annual 
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rate of return from eduction is 4.2% for male workers and 5.6% for female 
workers. These differences compared to the OLS-estimates indicate that there 
is a selection effect, which induces high quality female workers to enter the 
labour market. 
For male workers the OLS estimation results of parameters /3*3 and )3*4 
are significantly smaller than zero, indicating that periods of unemployment 
and out of the labour force have short term effects on subsequent wages. We 
find no long term negative wage effects of interruption periods for males. 
After introduction of the selectivity terms the parameter estimates change 
somewhat. We still fmd that /T3 is significantly smaller than zero, but /3*4 does 
not differ significantly from zero. So, only unemployment has significant short 
term effects. 
For female workers the OLS estimates of /3*3 and /3*5 do not differ 
significantly from zero. So, for female workers we fmd neither a short term 
nor a long term wage effect of an unemployment period. We also fmd (3*4,(3*6 
< 0. This indicates that there are both negative short term and long term 
wage effects of an interruption period outside the labour market. Introduction 
of the selectivity terms does not change these results. 
The values of the loglikelihoods of different restricted models are 
presented in table 5, confirming the conclusions drawn from table 43. 
- table 5 about here -
3
 We have tested for the exogeneity of the experience variables by 
performing a Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978). With the exception of the 
coëfficiënt of the instrumental variable for women's unemployment duration, all 
parameter estimates appeared to be highly insignificant. This suggests that the model 
is not misspecificied. 
We also estimated some fixed effects models. The dependent variable in the 
fixed effect model is the difference between the log of the wage rate in 1990 and the 
log of the wage rate in 1986. We included in our sample individuais who were in 
paid employment both in 1986 and 1990. As very few individuais experienced a 
spell out of the labor force in this period, we constructed a variable 'months not 
employed' between 1986 and 1990, which included both unemployment spells and 
spells out of the labor force. We further included a dummy for voluntary job 
mobility in the equations. The results showed few significant variables. Only the 
intercept terms are significantly different from zero and üie dummy for male job 
mobility. The signs of the parameter estimates indicate that the length of the spell 
not employed deereases wage growth. 
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In this paper we study the wage effects of career intermptions. We 
distinguish two types of ïnterruption period: unemployment and out of the 
labour force. The estimates of the wage equations are corrected for selectivity 
bias. The model is estimated on Dutch labour market data for males and 
females separately. 
Our analysis differs from previous analyses for two reasons. First, we 
distinguish between two types of career intermptions: unemployment and out 
of the labour force. Second, we explicitly investigate whether or not career 
intermptions have persistent effects on the earnings of workers who have been 
unemployed or out of the labour force for a while. 
The results show that the wage effect of a period of unemployment 
differs for males and females. For males we find a short term effect, which 
we do not find for females. There appears to be no long term negative effect 
of unemployment on subsequent earnings. With respect to an interruption 
period outside the labour force, the wage effects also differ between males and 
females. For males we find no wage effect. For females, there is both a short 
term and a long term negative wage effect. 
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Figure 1 Age-income profile for a worker with continuous and a worker with an 
interrupted working career. 
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Table 1 Survey of empirical studies on the wage effects of career interruptions 
Authors Data Sirnult. 
bias 
Selection 
bias 
Annual 
effect (%) 
Rebo 
und 
Mineer, Polachek 
(1974) 
USA 
1967 
yes no -1.5 no 
Sandell, Shapiro 
(1978) 
USA 
1967 
yes no less than 
-0.5 
no 
Mineer, Polachek 
(1978) 
USA 
1967-71 
yes no -2.5 no 
Corcoran, Duncan 
(1979) 
USA 
1975 
no no wh fem.: 0.5 
others: 0 
no 
Mineer, Ofek 
(1982) 
USA 
1966-74 
no no short: -9 
long: -1 
yes 
Corcoran, Duncan, 
Ponza (1983) 
USA 
1969-78 
no yes short: -4 
long: +a) 
yes 
Cox 
(1984) 
USA 
1951-73 
no no -4 no 
Gronau 
(1988) 
USA 
1976 
yes no -0.6 no 
Ruhm 
(1991) 
USA 
1971-75 
no yes _a> no 
Groot, Schippers, 
Siegers (1988/90) 
Netherl. 
1982 
no no male: -1 fem: 
-0.5 
no 
Ackum 
(1991) 
Sweden 
1981-85 
no yes -2 no 
Ermisch, Wright 
(1991/93) 
UK 
1980 
no yes full: -1 part: -
0.5 
no 
Edin, Nynabb 
(1992) 
Sweden 
1984-86 
yes no + 1 no 
aJ
 Sign of the effect, size not indicated 
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Table 2 
Sample means (standard errors in parentheses) 
males females 
education (years) 10.8 (2.8) 10.4 (2.7) 
age (years) 37.0 (10.3) 32.8 (10.2) 
work experience (months) 110.0 (106.8) 73.7 (75.0) 
past unemployment spells (months) 4.9 (14.9) 4.4 (16.5) 
past spells out of the labor force (months) 16.8(32.1) 52.2 (78.7) 
rebound after last spell of unemployment (months) 0.4 (2.3) 0.4(2.1) 
rebound after last spell out of labor force (months) 0.008(0.18) 0.72 (3.1) 
tenure (months) 107.3 (102.7) 57.3 (60.0) 
#observations 1317 736 
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Table 3 
Parameter estimates Iogit equation labor force status females (t-values in parentheses) 
NOINT ULTY OLTY UMTY OMTY 
intercept -1.368 
(1.731) 
0.146 
(0.223) 
-0.028 
(0.068) 
-1.795 
(1.461) 
-0.854 
(1.811) 
years of education 0.370** 
(5.833) 
0.181** 
(3.240) 
0.031 
(0.842) 
0.309** 
(3.099) 
0.193** 
(4.770) 
age -0.120** 
(7.158) 
-0.080** 
(6.528) 
O.Oil 
(1.709) 
-0.107** 
(4.063) 
-0.029** 
(3.871) 
region 1 0.293 
(0.691) 
0.035 
(0.109) 
0.081 
(0.387) 
-0.967 
(1.183) 
0.358 
(1.465) 
region 2 1.105** 
(3.067) 
-0.166 
(0.528) 
0.311 
(1.647) 
0.476 
(0.920) 
0.815** 
(3.770) 
region 3 0.186 
(0.485) 
-0.129 
(0.457) 
0.117 
(0.661) 
-0.219 
(0.399) 
0.044 
(0.202) 
technical education -0.601 
(0.731) 
-0.369 
(0.534) 
0.198 
(0.546) 
-0.077 
(0.068) 
-0.077 
(0.183) 
economic/administrati 
ve education 
0.137 
(0.303) 
-0.274 
(0.590) 
0.450 
(1.551) 
0.438 
(0.669) 
0.297 
(0.953) 
medical education 1.056 
(1.878) 
0.351 
(0.573) 
0.518 
(1.185) 
0.466 
(0.495) 
0.633 
(1.404) 
other vocational 
education 
-0.589 
(1.643) 
0.046 
(0.157) 
0.137 
(0.702) 
-0.509 
(0.900) 
-0.181 
(0.825) 
#observations 1743 
Loglikelihood -2271.88 
INT = worker is current ly unemployec i or out of labo r force (referen ce category) 
NOINT = worker has had no interruption period 
ULTY = current tenure after last spell of unemployment is less than two year 
OLTY = current tenure after last spell of out of the labor force is less than two years 
UMTY = current tenure after unemployment is more than two years 
OMTY = current tenure after out of the labor force is more than two years 
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Table 3 continued 
Parameter estimates logit equation labor force status males (t-values in parentheses) 
NOINT ULTY OLTY UMTY OMTY 
intercept -0.169 
(0.192) 
1.256 
(1.387) 
-8.632** 
(7.362) 
1.827 
(1.826) 
1.314 
(1.647) 
years of education 0.334** 
(4.006) 
0.239** 
(2.762) 
0.225* 
(2.439) 
0.135 
(1.403) 
0.231** 
(2.952) 
age -0.059** 
(4.365) 
-0.068** 
(4.796) 
0.145** 
(8.365) 
-0.080** 
(4.883) 
-0.033** 
(2.840) 
region 1 -0.116 
(0.269) 
0.395 
(0.916) 
0.424 
(0.897) 
0.114 
(0.234) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
region 2 1.136** 
(2.709) 
0.528 
(1.181) 
0.927* 
(1.998) 
0.697 
(1.444) 
0.967** 
(2.516) 
region 3 0.232 
(0.603) 
0.338 
(0.850) 
0.493 
(1.166) 
0.171 
(0.382) 
0.328 
(0.968) 
technical education 0.104 
(0.022) 
-0.384 
(0.804) 
-0.418 
(0.813) 
0.325 
(0.622) 
0.192 
(0.447) 
economic/administrati 
ve education 
-0.088 
(0.131) 
-0.439 
(0.636) 
-0.755 
(1.033) 
-0.740 
(0.871) 
0.282 
(0.455) 
agricultural education 0.210 
(0.235) 
-0.103 
(0.112) 
-1.096 
(1.120) 
-0.192 
(0.174) 
0.103 
(0.126) 
other vocational 
education 
-0.583 
(0.915) 
-1.262 
(1.902) 
-1.598* 
(2.145) 
-0.585 
(0.796) 
-0.763 
(1.290) 
#observations 1471 
Loglikelihood -1755.77 
INT = worker is current ly unemployec 1 or out of labo r force (referen ce category) 
NOINT = worker has had no interruption period 
ULTY = current tenure after last spell of unemployment is less than two year 
OLTY = current tenure after last spell of out of the labor force is less than two years 
UMTY = current tenure after unemployment is more than two years 
OMTY = current tenure after out of the labor force is more than two years 
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Table 4 Parameter estimates wage equations (t-values in parentheses) 
estimated equation: 
log wagei = j30 + ftS, + jSjX, + ^X2-, + 7Z + «jA,, + w2Ai2 + w3Ai3 + co4Ai4 + cjjAu + /t, 
where X, = E, + /37.(0,+U,+T1) + ft'.U1.(l-(R1„/24)) + ft*.Ui.(l-(R0,i/24))+ &'.RU]i +/36'.R0,i 
and: Z = {marital status, industry dummies, region dummies} 
males femaies 
not corrected for 
selectivity bias 
corrected for 
selectivity bias 
not corrected for 
selectivity bias 
corrected for 
selectivity bias 
A, 1.691 (32.8) 1.809(28.1) 1.603 (15.8) 1.631 (16.1) 
0, 0.045 (15.5) 0.042(11.1) 0.051 (10.6) 0.056 (10.4) 
j32/100 0.173 (7.3) 0.144 (5.4) 0.193 (5.0) 0.163 (4.1) 
0*3 -1.326(2.0) -1.905 (2.6) 0.191 (0.2) 0.564 (0.4) 
0*4 -0.780 (2.3) 0.220 (0.7) -0.843 (2.6) -0.907 (2.4) 
0*s -2.340 (0.7) 16.724(3.1) 1.048(0.2) 2.594 (0.4) 
0*6 -42.041 (0.8) -37.845(1.3) -11.288(5.4) -14.192(4.2) 
07 1.052(5.6) 1.062 (7.4) 0.958 (3.7) 0.848(3.1) 
0S/1OOOOO -0.216 (4.6) -0.227 (3.9) -0.267 (2.7) -0.276 (2.7) 
mar. status 0.122 (5.4) 0.092(4.1) 0.028 (0.8) 0.033 (0.9) 
industry 1 -0.004 (0.1) -0.029 (0.5) 0.028 (0.8) -0.048 (0.3) 
industry 2 -0.039(1.1) -0.050(1.4) -0.194 (2.7) -0.205 (2.9) 
industry 3 -0.020 (0.3) -0.034 (0.6) 0.023 (0.2) 0.016(0.1) 
industry 4 0.091 (1.7) 0.043 (0.9) -0.039 (0.4) -0.046 (0.5) 
industry 5 0.083 (2.3) 0.055(1.5) 0.008(0.1) -0.000 (0.0) 
unknown 0.008 (0.3) 0.009 (0.3) -0.019 (0.3) -0.024 (0.4) 
region 1 0.008 (0.3) -0.013 (0.5) -0.033 (0.8) -0.033 (0.8) 
region 2 0.046 (2.2) 0.043 (1.9) 0.054 (1.6) 0.035 (0.9) 
region 3 0.035 (1.6) 0.017 (0.8) 0.038(1.1) -0.049 (1.4) 
w, -0.002 (2.4) 0.000023 (0.7) 
Cü2 0.000284 (0.0) -0.000697(1.8) 
<o3 0.0000085 (9.4) 0.0141 (1.9) 
«4 -0.00067 (5.9) -0.0000009(0.3) 
W j -0.0217(1.8) 0.00306 (0.5) 
ff 0.264 (66.5) 0.255 (67.4) 0.297 (52.5) 0.295 (52.8) 
LogL 1026.32 1042.93 450.222 455.188 
#obs. 1234 1234 632 632 
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Table 5 
Values of logiikelihood of restricted models and likelihood ratio test 
restrictions value 
logiikelihood 
males not 
corrected for 
selectivity bias 
value of 
logiikelihood 
males corrected 
for selectivity 
bias 
value of 
logiikelihood 
females not 
corrected for 
selectivity bias 
value of 
logiikelihood 
females 
corrected for 
selectivity bias 
no restrictions 1026.32 1042.93 450.222 455.188 
0*5 = 0 1026.14 1042.69 450.188 455.057 
/3*6 = 0 1025.04 1042.58 445.722 451.299 
0*3 = /?*5 = 0 1022.90 1039.68 450.162 454.941 
/3*4 = /3*6 = 0 1024.66 1042.58 443.403 451.75l' 
0*3 = -$1 1026.16 1042.76 449.242 454.351 
0*4 = -ft 1026.02 1039.82 450.086 455.134 
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